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Introduction 
This series of Occasional Papers is designed to bring to the attention of the reader 
work that focuses on Asian communication and culture. Compared to most areas 
of Asian Studies, communication and media have been largely ignored, a fact the 
recent Australian 'push into Asia' reveals. These Occasional Papers redress this 
absence and deal with a comprehensive range of issues that inform our 
understanding of the importance of communication in forging links between 
Australia and Asia. Consequently their scope is far-reaching, covering cultural, 
political, economic, and increasingly, technological topics and their relationship 
to the communication process that lies at the heart of Australian/ Asian relations. 
In short, they will chart a new emerging mediascape in the Asia Pacific region. 
As such they must be viewed as work in progress. The authors published in this 
series include academics, journalists and post-graduate students from Australia 
and throughout Asia. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: New Channels of Communication 
In May 1992 soldiers from the Thai army turned their guns on middle class and 
student demonstrators who were on the streets of Bangkok pressing for the 
resignation of the military-backed prime minister - General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon. A BBC camera crew was there. Among the burning cars and 
barricades, the crew filmed an anonymous young Thai man. The close-up image 
of his face filled the camera operator's viewfinder. He shouted in clear English: 
"We want the rest of the world to see and hear what the military dictators do to 
our people, the Thai people, the innocent people. We want the rest of the world 
to know." 1 Then the BBC crew filmed soldiers walking across the prostrate 
bodies of people they had arrested and placed in the lobby of the Royal Hotel, 
occasionally hitting them with the butts of rifles. Outside, in the hotel forecourt, 
other demonstrators were placed face down, "trussed like chickens, hands bound 
by the shirts off their backs".2 
Within hours, these images had been sent via satellite in a report to the BBC 
World Service Television ( BBCWST) newsroom in London. Shortly 
aftenvards, the report was beamed via the AsiaSat 1 satellite directly into 
millions of homes across Asia on a BBCWST news bulletin ... a free service 
that had been operating to Asia for less than a year. Among the viewers were 
thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Bangkok residents. 
At the same time, Thailand's long-established state-run television stations were 
telling viewers that the 'madness'-' on the streets was being formented by 'rioters' 
and 'troublemakers·• from the Communist Party of Thailand with support from 
foreign communist groups. 5 Although Thai television camera crews had 
recorded the violence, the government stations did not use the pictures. 
For weeks afterwards videotaped copies of the BBC reports, contradicting the 
regime's line, were selling on the streets of Bangkok for 200 baht (A$12). The 
Far Eastern Economic Review reported: "[C]rowds gather in homes, university 
campuses, and video rental shops to witness what the discredited government of 
prime minister Suchinda Kraprayoon would not permit to be broadcast locally."6 
Clearly, at this time of national crisis, the loss of the state ' s monopoly on 
televised information was brought sharply into focus. 
This episode neatly illustrates the central issue in this paper: the relationship 
between state power and the new international satellite news services. Do the 
economic and technological movements behind these services - which do not 
respect frontiers - spell the end of state sovereignty in the regulation of televisual 
information? What do the changes mean for politics in the region - a region 
whose development has been premised on authoritarian media policies? These 
questions cross many sectors of political science: theories of communication, of 
the state, of democratic transition and of international political economy. 
At the heart of this changed broadcasting landscape is a technological 
development known as Direct Broadcasting by Satellite - or DBS. DBS allows 
television signals to be relayed via satellite directly to a home, hotel or business 
from a distant location, possibly another country. The signal is received by a 
satellite dish, otherwise known as a parabolic antenna. The most common, and 
affordable, parabolic antennae are one to three metres in diameter and cost 
between US$400 and US$1,200. The DBS system bypasses all terrestrial relay 
equipment, which has traditionally been under state control. In parts of 
Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia, parabolic antennae are now common features 
in both urban and rural areas. With this te.chnology, many established 
broadcasting regulations are largely irrelevant. 
In Southeast Asia, two key satellite systems have been central to the delivery of 
DBS news services - Palapa and AsiaSat I. By the end of the century there will 
be many more systems. Palapa is the oldest of the existing systems. It is owned 
and controlled by the Indonesian government and is currently used by a range of 
domestic and international broadcasters.7 Palapa's primary footprint covers an 
area from northern Australia to southern China and Bangladesh.8 From the 
perspective of this paper, Palapa's most important customer is the Cable News 
Network (CNN), which began a free-to-air service in 1991. Australia Television 
the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's external television service - became 
another broadcaster to use Palapa in 1993. The other satellite system is Asia Sat I 
which has two footprints covering an area from the eastern Mediterranean, to the 
Horn of Africa, to India, Sumatra then north to eastern Russia then across 
somhern China to the Crimean states. AsiaSat I delivers Star TV9 - since 
October 1993 controlled by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. Star TV is a 
network of five channels. 
2 
Originally, both AsiaSatl footprints carried BBCWST on the Star network. 
However, the BBC service was dropped on the northern footprint in April 1994 
to placate the Chinese government, with whose blessing Murdoch was hoping to 
tap into the Chinese market. 10 Beijing authorities had been unsettled by 
Murdoch's proclamation after his purchase last year of Star TV that satellite 
technology meant 'totalitarian regimes' could no longer halt the free-flow of 
information. 11 Shortly after Murdoch's pronouncement, Beijing introduced 
sweeping restrictions against private ownership of parabolic antennae. 12 Perhaps 
the Chinese Government was mindful what had occurred on the streets of 
Bangkok in 1992. Murdoch's subsequent decision to prevent BBCWST from 
being beamed into China via the Star newtork shows that there are forms of state 
power that can influence outcomes in the DBS industry. 
This is more broadly reflected by the many agreements between the DBS 
networks and terrestrial broadcasters in Southeast Asia for the relaying or 
replaying of the international news services. The terrestrial broadcasters, some 
of them state-controlled stations, receive the DBS service via a parabolic antenna 
then play out the material using ground-based systems such as microwave or 
cable. These are known as hybrid systems . Under these arrangements, an 
element of control remains with the terrestrial broadcaster to cut off or censor 
news, an option that has been used already in Thailand. In this way, the state 
maintains its status as 'gatekeeper' over television information. Clearly, in 
Southeast Asia there exists an environment for dynamic political and commercial 
interaction in the satellite television industry. 
This monograph will analyse the politics associated with the arrival of these 
international news services in the Southeast Asian region. Four countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be studied. They are 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The paper considers the impact of 
DBS news and information on the conduct of politics in those countries. As well , 
it investigates - and seeks to explain - why there has been such a diversity of 
policy between the four governments, with the more economically advanced 
being the most resistant to international DBS television. 
The arrival in Southeast Asia of these DBS news services has been something of 
a shock for a region accustomed to state-controlled television news and high 
levels of government control of media in general. CNN and BBCWST are 24 
hour news and information channels. While much of the programming is rooted 
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in the affairs of Europe and America, and quite detached from the news agenda 
of the region, crucial international and regional events are, for the first time, 
being delivered with Western-liberal journalistic style and methods. As well as 
the Thai uprising, there has been extensive coverage of events such as the Gulf 
War, communal violence in India and national elections in the United States, the 
Philippines and Japan. 
Some commentators record that this type of satellite service "defies the tradition 
that national sovereignty includes state control over television within a nation ' s 
borders." 13 Arthur C. Clarke comments in the Far Eastern Economic Review 
that "there'll soon be an enormous amount of free news broadcasts which will 
cross all borders".' 4 Prima Facie, the technological and commercial structures 
behind DBS news do undermine the tradition of sovereign control of the 
electronic mass media. However, the popular image of continuous Western-style 
news being on offer to the peoples of Southeast Asia- challenging governments' 
version of events - needs to be put into context. 
In the short time since free-to-air DBS news has become available, its level of 
penetration into countries of ASEAN has varied widely. In the most 
economically developed nation, Singapore, parabolic antennae are illegal - and 
virtually non-existent .15 The Malaysian government has banned parabolic 
antennae and is threatening to fine or imprison those who do not comply, but 
their use remains widespread. 16 On the other hand, Indonesia has an 
increasingly liberal policy under which more than half a million parabolic 
antennae dot the country. 17 Thailand has a laissez-faire policy, having dropped 
a licensing system in 1992. The number of hotels and English-speaking 
households with a parabolic antenna capable of taking in services from the 
Palapa satellite system is put at 4 I 7,000 in Indonesia, 56,000 in Thailand and, 
despite the bans, 18,000 in Malaysia.'s 
From the perspective of both theory and empirical data, published research on 
the topic ofDBS in Southeast Asia has been sparse. Several explanations can be 
offered for the scarcity of material: for example, the lack of resources and 
encouragement for critical indigenous inquiry into the politics of information; 
the dynamic nature of the medium and the constantly changing nature of the 
political process relating to the industry; or the apparent preference among 
Western researchers to focus on case studies in the developed world. 
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Transnational DBS news services have been operating for almost a decade in 
parts of Europe and North America. Consequently, the analyses of the impact on 
the Euro-American scene are more numerous, although they vary widely in their 
conceptual, theoretical and methodological perspectives. This paper needs to be 
analytically sensitive to the cultural and political differences that exist between 
the cases in ASEAN countries and those in the Euro-American context. Refining 
a framework pertinent to Southeast Asia is a formidable challenge. 
There are four broad categories of relevant literature. They are considered here 
in order of theoretical complexity, beginning with the least sophisticated. 
A vigorous, but highly descriptive, body of material emerges from the Asian 
press. About 200 articles are used to piece together recent developments in the 
DBS news industry in Southeast Asia. They contain relevant and useful 
technical data. In the case of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the items tend 
to reinforce or defend government broadcasting policy. Ironically, owing to the 
sensitivity towards media analysis among ASEAN governments, the most 
comprehensive press coverage of a country's DBS policy is often found in the 
newspapers of neighbouring countries. For instance, the Malaysian press is quite 
willing to canvass issues relating to Singapore - and vice versa - but press 
reporting about one's own country is largely confined to official statements. 
Thailand is the exception. The Bangkok press has been a platform for open 
debate on Thai satellite television policy, due both to the liberal traditions in the 
industry and the commercial interests in television sought by the large newspaper 
organisations in Bangkok. Press articles are central to the task of analysing the 
events surrounding the May 1992 Thai civil uprising in Chapter 5. In addition, 
the Hong-Kong business press - notably the Far Eastern Economic Review and 
the Asian Wall Street Journal -provides key source material. The fact that these 
journals tend to editorially reflect economic rationalist and deregulatory policies 
needs to be kept in mind, as do their frequent clashes with authorities in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. 
Second, there is a relative abundance of literature outlining the official 
broadcasting policies of the ASEAN governments. This is in the form of articles 
and conference papers presented to forums linked to organisations such as the 
Asia Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) and the Asian Mass Communication 
Research and Information Centre (AMIC). Sometimes, these are polemical 
works, whose authors seek to explain media policy in terms of the imperatives of 
nation building and national cohesion. It is not unusual in these works for the 
5 
Western-liberal media ethos to be criticised as being impractical and culturally 
insensitive. This literature appears to be rekindling the 'media imperialism' 
debate . 
This brings us to the third category of literature: that concerning international 
news flow. It is an important precursor to the topic at hand and has commanded 
considerable attention from governments, international organisations, academics 
and journalists- reaching a crescendo in the early 1980s after the publication of 
the MacBride Commission report to UNESC0. 19 Primarily, media imperialism 
refers to the perceived imbalance in the international flow of information -
including news - that has emerged within the global network of cultural and 
economic relations . Within this structure the transnational European and US-
based news organisations report some 90 per cent of the world's news.20 
In the eyes of representatives of developing countries, this 'cartel' of agencies 
represents the cultural, political and economic interests of the West. The flow of 
information is "uni-directional and vertical, from North to South for the most 
part". 21 The MacBride report argues that : "[T]he one-way flow in 
communications is basically a reflection of the world's dominant political and 
economic structures, which tend to maintain or reinforce the dependence of 
poorer countries on the richer".22 With these themes in mind, a useful working 
definition of media imperialism can be stated thus: "[T]he process whereby the 
ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are 
singly or together subject to substantial pressure from the media interests of any 
other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the 
country so affected". 23 
While the force of these sentiments remains pertinent, technological and political 
developments have changed key institutional arrangements for the transmission 
and exchange of news. Firstly, the increased access to satellite services has seen 
a growth in the past ten years of television news exchange. On the global level 
-and perhaps reflecting the 'media imperialism' structure detected in the print 
news agencies - the industry is dominated by Reuters Television (formerly 
Visnews) and Worldwide Television News (WTN, formerly UPITN) . These 
agencies provide material to the four ASEAN countries in this study. 
However, on a regional level, there has been increased cooperation in news 
exchange. The Asian Pacific Broadcasting Union (ABU) is the most relevant to 
this study. Elsewhere in the world there are similar regional groupings such as 
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the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and the Arab States Broadcasting 
Union. The ABU has in place arrangements for Asian broadcasters to exchange 
news material and embark on collaborative projects. 
Until very recently, Reuters Television, WTN and ABU exchange structures 
were the only mechanisms to bring material to international television news 
audiences in ASEAN countries on a daily basis. The material was, however, 
subject to editorial control by the rules of each country. The gatekeeper role of 
the state was maintained. Clearly, the direct broadcasting into homes by satell ite 
of uncensored material from Western news companies represents a huge leap 
from the news exchange arrangements. 
There has been a failure to detect the significance of that leap in some literature. 
For instance, Gurevitch considers the international news agenc ies, the regional 
news agencies and the direct satellite broadcasters such as BBC and CNN as 
three 'arms' of "a complex international system of international distribution and 
exchange."N I would argue that, in the Southeast Asian context, the DBS players 
represent an entirely new variable in regional politics because of their abi lity to 
largely avoid laws and control of states. They need to be considered as a factor 
further along the evolutionary con tinuum of international communications. 
In an effort to clarify the significance of the global DBS news arrangements, we 
turn to a fourth category of literature, wh ich rarely mentions issues in Asia, but 
is central to this paper. It is concerned with communications as a component of 
changing international economic and political structures, especially the global 
movement of capital and search for economies of scale gained by reaching the 
audiences of the developing world. The rise of the 'new media' - cable and 
satellite television - stems from a cross cutting of technological, economic and 
political variables. 
The vast bulk of this literature focuses on Western Europe. The region was, after 
all, one of the first to have to deal with satellite television services cutting across 
borders and diverse language groups. There are strong grounds for applying 
elements of communications theory developed in the Western European arena to 
cases in this paper. Notions of national sovereignty are broadly the same in a 
Western European and Southeast Asian context. Equally, each region has a 
highly developed international grouping: the European Union (EU) and ASEAN. 
Since the 1970s the ASEAN states have also become increasingly intertwined 
within global economic networks . The universality of the commercial 
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imperatives of satellite television means both Europe and Asia will feel its 
effects. 
The driving forces behind these imperatives are the economies of scale gained by 
the transnational media conglomerates from the larger international audiences. 
Poweiful international economic influences are helping to design the future 
of the media. With the increasing internationalisation of capital and the 
growth of the transnational economy it would, in fact, be unthinkable for 
television to remain rooted within domestic settings only. In years to come 
it may become even more detached from its cultural roots as a new categ01y 
of television - an international categoty- takes on greater significance. 25 
In light of these developments , concerns about sovereignty have emerged. The 
EU report - TV Broadcasting in Europe and the New Technologies posits: 
The geopolitical boundaries of Europe are destroyed by the new technologies 
for distributing electronic messages and the twelve member states become, 
with the throwing of one switch, a single market and viewing audience. 26 
Sovereignty in the European context appears to be more concerned with the 
politics of culture rather than the politics of domestic administration. 
[B)ecause the various forms of broadcasting by satellite straddle national 
frontiers, there are implications for those nations which desire to retain and 
encourage their own cultures in the face of foreign broadcasting .~7 
This emphasis is understandable. The strength of socio-political institutions and 
relative stability of political ideology across Western Europe does not elevate 
questions of political information to the level found in Southeast Asian countries. 
The European studies tend to concentrate on concerns about cultural integrity, 
rather than overt domestic political tensions stemming from news and 
information services. 
Without doubt, ' cultural integrity' is also an important issue in Southeast Asia. 
Governments, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, frequently oppose satellite 
broadcasting on the basis of the violence or perceived immorality of Western 
drama and pop culture such as music. Non-news programming is not, however, 
the focus of attention in this paper. The political implications of satellite services 
such as MTV, Home Box Office or US sports channels will not be specifically 
8 
canvassed. News and information services are the central focus of this 
monograph. It should be noted though that the same economic forces lie behind 
the proliferation of drama and pop culture DBS services in Southeast Asia. Like 
news, pop culture is a valuable commodity. Television programming is now no 
different from other goods and services. It can be traded freely. Although, as the 
media imperialism model suggests, the dominant global political and econom ic 
systems mean the trade is likely to flow in greater volume from the West to the 
developing regions. As will be shown in this paper, the genesis of international 
satellite television is rooted in economic opportunities. 
The sharp differences in concerns over 'sovereignty' of televisusal information 
between Western European and Southeast Asian states perhaps reflects different 
stages of political development. While the ASEAN governments are still 
engaged in 'nation building', the Western Europeans are tentatively becoming 
more politically integrated under arrangements such as the treaties of Rome and 
Maastricht. The notion of satellite television 'destroying' political boundaries, 
as outlined in the EU report, is anathema to the Southeast Asian government 
leaderships. 
These differences are reflected by the extent to which each has moved towards 
regional cooperation. While satellite communications policy in Europe has been 
steered towards regulatory harmonisation across the economic community, the 
Southeast Asian governments have, until this year, been stridently unilateral in 
their policy development. In 1993 Khushu noted: "At the regional level there has 
been no concerted move to harmonise telecommunications policies, including 
those which concern sate llite delivery. The first, tentative moves have been 
made this year with a proposal by the ABU for a code of ethics for satellite 
broadcasters beaming services into the region. As yet, only the Philippines 
government has expressed an interest in making the code legis lati vely 
enforceable."28 
Developments in Southeast Asia are in sharp contrast to those in Europe where 
there has been a move towards the adoption of an 'Open Skies' policy.'" 
Europe's policy has evolved from the coinc idence of broad EU policy 
harmonisation and terrestrial broadcasting deregulation. The commercial 
opportunities driving satellite television have been given political backing by the 
EU's constituent governments. The EU's White Paper on the internal market 
argues that "an ex tended market in broadcasting will bring economies of scale 
and improve the international trading position of member states". 30 These widely 
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differing policy directions highlight the need for caution when drawing on 
European experiences for theoretical guidance on Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, 
the factor of economic opportunity in the arrival and development of satellite 
television is clearly central in both cases. 
Despite the sharp differences in responses to satellite broadcasting between 
Western Europe and Southeast Asia, they share the experience of significant 
policy disarray. Negrine's Satellite Broadcasting: The Politics and Implications 
of the New Media/' was one of the first works to articulate this phenomenon. 
The changes currently taking place are at such an advanced stage of 
development that academic or even policy debates matter little in the rapidly 
changing world of the new media. The speed of technological change and the 
inability (or unwillingness) of govemments across the world to plan (or place 
in a strait jacket) the direction of these development, has given the look of an 
unstoppable force. 31 
This idea that governments have failed to match the policy demands arising from 
the commercial development of satellite networks will be considered in this 
paper in the Southeast Asian arena. It is especially curious that while satellite 
television has seemed "an unstoppable force" in the West, two ASEAN 
governments in this study have indeed attempted, drawing on Negrine's 
phrasing, to place it in a ' strait jacket'. The results have been mixed. 
A subsequent - and important - theoretical development by Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos focuses on the relationship between states and transnational 
broadcasters3-' Primarily, it explores the ability of states to constrain 
developments in satellite broadcasting in the highly complex world marketplace 
of communications and information. Attention is paid to the conceptualisation 
of state sovereignty, with focus on the 'realist-sovereign' paradigm versus the 
'interdependence' approach. 
While the realist model of sovereignty assumes that each nation state makes 
its own individual calculations of self-interest, the interdependence model 
emphasises that in place of a single decision-making body, there may be 
several layers of collaboration -from the political to the bureaucratic, from 
public state organisations to private economic actors -all attempting to 
'manage' or 'stir' the links which emerge. Similarly, whereas in the 'realist-
sovereign' model, the bargaining between the state and other states is the 
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focus, in the 'interdependence' model the suggestion is that governments 
counter the loss of autonomous control either by exploiting the network of 
interdependent relationships in order to extract suitable economic or other 
rewards for internal consumption, or by identifying the collective policy 
network with significant policy ends. 3-1 
The interdependence model is clearly more sophisticated and can accommodate 
the variables that arise from the array of data incorporated in this paper. It avoids 
the pitfalls of the descriptive analysis in much of the liberal press. Writers from 
this tradition have failed to pay sufficient attention to the complexity of state 
power and tended to treat the intrusion of satellite news as a zero-sum game with 
each state. Evidence introduced in this paper, especially that examining the case 
of the Indonesian state, attests to the efficacy of Negrine and 
Papathanassopoulos' approach to the interdependence theory. 
The above overview shows that, like governmental policy, academic analysis 
is lagging well behind technological and economic developments in the region. 
The limited work on Europe provides a starting point for analysis of Southeast 
Asia's DBS experience. As well, there is an abundance of empirical data relating 
to the DBS sector in the four ASEAN countries. Obvious key differences 
between the regions are the system of state organisation and the contemporary 
roles of state broadcasters. 
In addition, the research for this paper has been conducted with a broader 
theoretical tradition in mind: that developed in the vigorous literature on 
democratisation in Latin America and East Asia in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
work of O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead focuses on the episodic roles of 
elites and leaders within broader economic and political frameworks. 
An underlying thread throughout the work [of O'Donnell et a/] is the 
acceptance of the type of behavioralist propositions often associated with 
Juan Linz, in which individual decisions and ongoing strategic interaction do 
matter even if generally constrained by objective stmctural conditions ... 
Structural conditions are important, to be sure, analysis of their impact must 
be overlapped with conjunctural and other superstructural factors that 
broaden the range of indeterminacy with regard to possible outcomes.J5 
This approach will allow for detailed empirical evidence to be introduced and 
explored within the context of broader economic and socio-political movements. 
II 
In this paper, the overarching movement in the case of ASEAN has been the 
internationalisation of its economies and the cotTesponding inflow of capital and 
investment funds. Some of this investment has been directed at the news and 
information industry. In this environment, attempts by government regimes to 
quarantine economic liberalism from the political landscape have led to tensions 
between classes and between elements of the state elite. Analysis is enriched by 
looking at the strategic decisions and actions by individuals and groups. 
Finally, in addition to the the written primary and secondary sources, a number 
of interviews were conducted for this paper. 36 Interviewees include senior 
managers from the BBC and Australia Television, industry analysts in Indonesia, 
Thailand and Malaysia and a Western diplomat based in Bangkok. Several have 
requested anonymity. In these cases a description of their positions will be used 
when they are quoted. 
Summary 
The focus of this thesis is how the international DBS services impact upon the 
state. The paper will analyse and explain the diversity of responses between the 
four ASEAN states to DBS and consider the sustainability of each policy. 
Drawing on detailed case studies, it will consider the effect of the satellite news 
services on political patterns in Southeast Asia. 
These issues will be dealt with in four substantive chapters. The historic role of 
mass media - particularly television- in the context of state power in Singapore, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand will be explored in Chapter 2. 
The arrival of international satellite television news services in Southeast Asia 
will be traced in Chapter 3. Driven by the search for new markets and associated 
economies of scale, the transnational media organisations are able to overcome 
long-established regulatory frameworks using new technology and economic 
power. The news traditions and perspectives of the transnational broadcasting 
organisations - which often lie at odds with state broadcasters - will be 
canvassed. 
Chapter 4 considers the political issues arising from the establishment of the 
services, by analysing the complex interaction of economic, political and 
technological change. The responses to satellite television, including attempts 
by some governments to quarantine direct satellite broadcasts from other areas 
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of commercial act ivity, will be explored. A key task here is tracing the tension 
between economic libera lism and politica l authoritar ianism. Episodes of 
collaboration and conflict occur between different levels of the state apparatus 
and transnational economic players. Finally, the impact of international satellite 
news on patterns of political di scourse will be canvassed. Importantly , this 
includes changes to the structure and content of domestic television policy. 
The civil uprising in Thailand in May 1992 will be considered in some detail in 
Chapter 5 in order to exam ine the effect of international telev ision in times of 
national cri sis. It is the first such crisis to emerge in Southeast Asia since the 
arrival of the DBS news services. Much of the political momentum behind the 
civil unrest is attributed to Bangkok's rising middle class. DBS is shown to be 
one of the critical factors in the dynamic information environment that developed 
during the crisi s period. Additionally, individuals are shown to affect outcomes, 
although their options are confined within broad political and economic 
structures. 
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Chapter 2 
ASEAN's 'Nation-Building' Media 
"Tell the journalists not to worsen the situation and cause unrest among the 
public through their questions to the officials about the real situation ... " 
President Suharto to Information Minister Harmoko, June 1989. ' 
The overwhelming influences behind the shaping of the contemporary news 
media in Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have been the historic struggles 
against colonialism and the subsequent state led task of ' nation building ' . 
Sovereignty is a prize of independence - and is jealously guarded by the state 
apparatus. More recently, the governments of these countries have sought to aid 
nation-building by exposing their economies to international commerce. In 
effect, they have become developmentalist regimes which want their economies 
to change- while the political systems remain stable. Thai land has a unique 
political tradition, a reflection of its precarious independence- maintained in the 
era of high colonialism when territories around it were governed by European 
powers. The Thai press is liberal, while television is heavily state-controlled. 
This chapter will develop the links between nation building, mass media and 
state structure. Theories of the modern state relating to nation building reach the 
very heart of the media control issue: state power. In the words of Lent, 
Southeast Asian domestic news providers have been required to "support and 
cooperate with the authorities by stressing positive news, by ignoring much 
negative and oppositionist information, and by supporting governmental plans 
and ideologies"2 Television is crucial to this strategy. 
State broadcasters are at the centre of the television industry in the four countries. 
In Singapore the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation remains the sole 
broadcaster, while in Thailand the five networks are controlled either by the 
government or the military, which are often the same thing .3 Elsewhere in 
ASEAN, where commercial networks exist, they are politically and 
economically linked to the ruling elite. Malaysia's single commercial network -
TV3 -is owned by the Fleet group, which is closely aligned to the ruling party, 
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United Malays National Organisation (UMN0).4 Indonesia's first and biggest 
commercial channel Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia (RCTI) belongs to the 
Bimantara group whose chairman is Bam bang Trihatmodjo - the son of President 
Suharto.5 
At the end of this chapter, attention will turn to the broad economic movements 
that begin to erode state control of mass media. In the case of Indonesia, early 
involvement in the international communications marketplace is shown to 
introduce policy contradictions. It is a forerunner of tensions which are to 
emerge in all states based on attempts to maintain state control of a commodity 
- news - that is becoming increasingly internationalised due to economic and 
technological change. 
It is only by understanding the contemporary histories of the four states that one 
can fully appreciate the significance of the arrival of satellite television serv ices 
such as BBCWST or CNN. The vastly different assumptions underlying the 
state media systems and the Western-liberal broadcasters suggest their meeting 
will result in both conflict and change. 
Consider Article I of the Indonesian Journalists' Association's code of ethics, 
which states: "An Indonesian journalist shall be ... faithful to Pancasila". 6 
Pancasila is the official state ideology of Indonesia and is embodied in the 
preamble to the country's 1945 constitution. 7 What this means for media 
philosophy in Indonesia is neatly summarised by Mehra: 
Pancasila society disapproves of individualism and individual rights, the 
starting point of Westem liberal political the01y. It consequelltly rejects the 
notion of an uninhibited and robust press that undertakes vehement, caustic 
and unpleasant attacks on govemment and pubic officials the sine qua non of 
Westem press theory. Instead, the press is viewed as a partner in national 
developmellt, within the framework of Pancasila."' 
Clearly, some Western communications analysts would refute the characteristics 
ascribed to their media systems by Mehra. However, his summary of the state 
philosophy underlines the epistemological complexity of analysing the politics 
of news in Southeast Asia . Issues of social organisation, economics, nationhood, 
state power and development are raised in Mehra's formulation, which stand at 
odds with Western liberal precepts. 
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In an effort to account for this complexity, it is worth recalling the words of 
Adams relating to the variety of structural parameters surrounding news. "News 
production requires debatable decisions about priorities and depiction of events 
and issues. These decisions are made within the confines of cultural, legal, 
poHtical, technical and commercial interests."9 There is clearly margin for wide 
differences of opinion and approach to news. 
Power and the 'invention' of the nation-state in 'Nation-building' is a recurring 
theme in the communications literature of the developing world. Considerable 
scholarly debate has surrounded theories of the modern state which delve into the 
concept of 'nation'. A key question is whether the sentiment of nation is a 
natural and spontaneous sentiment arising from among the people or an artificial 
construct imposed by powerful forces from above. More simply, is the national 
consciousness that underlies the sense of nation 'primordial' or 'invented ' ? If it 
is invented, who benefits? 
Anderson contends that the modern nation requires strangers to imagine 
themselves united as part of a large-scale community. Subsequently, "the nation 
exists as much in people's minds as it does in the world". 10 But achieving that 
sense of shared identity, especially among peoples as diverse as those in ASEAN 
countries, would require mobilisation of mass media and educational institutions 
to promote symbols of a common heritage. This alludes to Hobsbawm's concept 
of the 'invention of tradition': "[T]he nation, with its associated phenomena: 
nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest .. . rest on 
exercises of social engineering which are often deliberate and always 
innovative."'' 
Smith perhaps puts it more simply: "Today, in many parts of Africa and Asia, it 
is the state itself, through its economic policies, its political patronage and mass 
educations system, that seeks, with varying success, to create and narrate the 
emergent nation." 12 There would appear to be little objection to these political 
methods from the leaderships of countries in this study. The heads of certain 
ASEAN governments are among the leading proponents of media involvement 
in nation-building. 
For instance, Lee Kuan Yew, when Prime Minister of Singapore, told US 
newspaper editors: "From ... unpromising beginnings we have had to try to build 
one nation .. . [W]e have to create enough shared va lues and a single national 
identity ... [W]e hope ... to bring the press in the different languages closer 
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together, approximating, however inadequately, one national view." 13 In a 
speech on Indonesia's National Press Day in 1989, President Suharto 
proclaimed: "One area of activity which needs follow-up by the national press is 
the wider dissemination of information about progress, the creation of new 
values and the formation of public opinion, all of which will help us be a strong 
nation. The press should be a partner in the process of nation building."" 
But these proclamations by political leaders take nations as a given mode of 
political organisation. Difficulties with this assumption are voiced by Gellner: 
Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men [sic] as an inherent 
though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which 
sometimes take pre-existing cultures and tums them into nations, sometimes 
invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that is a reality, for 
better or worse, and in general an inescapable one. 15 
Analysis of nation-building needs to be taken further, to the very centre of the 
study of politics - power. A very effective encapsulation of this idea is put by 
Breuilly: "[N]ationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics, and politics 
is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about the control of the 
state". 16 Clearly this line of argument is central to explaining the relationships 
between media and state power in Southeast Asia. 
Another key concept that has evolved alongside nation-building is 'development 
journalism' . In 1964, Schramm identified the use of media by developing states 
to "contribute to the feeling of nationhood, to help teach the necessary skills and 
technology, to extend the effective market, to aid the process of national 
planning, and to prepare people to play new roles in a modernising society". 17 
This developmental perspective argues that the Western liberal model of a 
critical, adversarial media is not appropriate for ASEAN states, even though 
member countries, such as Singapore, are well beyond the 'developing' stage. 
This lends support to the idea, articulated by Lent, that the persistence of the 
developmental policy can be attributed to attempts by government regimes to 
maintain political obedience. Lent argues a key government control mechanism 
is "the misuse of development communication to uncritically promote 
governmental policies and nationalleaderships". 18 
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Malaysia's Media: "An Instrument of Leadership" 
Malaysian news providers, like their Indonesian counterparts, are required to 
follow a national philosophy- Rukunegara. Although there are similarities with 
Indonesia's Pancasi la, Malaysia's philosophy appears less pervasive. 19 In 
general, the state keeps a tight rein on news and information through specific 
press laws and broader rules relating to perceived sedition, internal security and 
official secrets. Some forty seven pieces of legislation and ordinances affect 
mass media operations in the country. ~0 Some date to the colonial era, such as the 
Printing Presses and Periodicals Act ( 1948), which was revised in 1971 .21 Means 
says the existing UMNO administration, led by Mahathir Mohamad, assumes 
"that the mass media must be organised and utilised as an instrument of 
leadership to achieve national development goa ls and the ideals of the 
Rukunegara while avoiding any divisive public controversies or inflaming 
communal passions over the 'sensitive issues' ."22 Communalism appears to be 
particularly important, as it is a recurring theme in government papers justifying 
media control. 
The multi-racial makeup of Malaysia is reflected in its press. In 1989, there were 
thirty-five daily newspapers in the country, twenty published in Mandarin, eight 
in English, three in the national language, Bahasa Malaysia, three in Tamil and 
one in Malayalam, a language spoken in southwest India. 23 Aga inst this 
background, racial harmony emerges as a key component of nation-building and 
national development. The Prime Minister - Mahathir Mohamad - alluded to this 
theme when outlining media policy in 1985. 
For a society precariously balanced on the razor's edge, where one false or 
even true word can lead to calamity, it is criminal irresponsibility to allow 
that one word to be uttered.24 
Broadly speaking, developmental perspectives remain de rigeur in the Malaysian 
media. Madzhi Johari asserts that "Ideology is a guide upon which a nation finds 
direction in and achieves objectives of its national development ... We [Malaysia] 
perceive and practise freedom of choice and democracy differently. Our 
perception and practice are not simi lar to that of the developed countries."25 
Malaysia's television industry has grown with this ethos. The national 
broadcaster - Radio Television Malaysia (RTM) - was launched in December 
1963 with two networks, TV I and TV2. According to the Director General of 
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RTM, Jaafar Kam in: "TV I is considered the national network in the sense that 
the programs are aimed towards developing a national identity through a 
common language."2" TV2 screens more foreign fi lms and enterta inment 
programmes, as well as those in other Malaysian languages such as Eng li sh, 
Tamil and Mandarin. 
TV3 is perhaps the most interes ting component of the e lec tronic media in 
Malaysia- particularly its relationship with UMNO. TV3's major shareholder, 
Fleet Holdings, has grown to 'astronomica l proportions' during the years of 
UMNO rule, having been initially set up in the 1970s to "wres t control of the 
print media" from Malaysian-Chinese and foreign ownership.~7 Fleet a lso 
controls the daily newspapers New Straits Times, Malay Mail, Berita Harian, 
Shin Min and three Sunday newspapers, as well as extensive book publishing and 
industrial, transport and banking enterpri ses . ~8 Through this aiTa ngement - which 
satisfies Malay or Bumiputera2Y aspirations as defined in government policy -
UMNO governments exercise considerable control and influence on news. They 
have "an assurance that the company will toe the government line in terms of 
politics".30 
Relations between the foreign media and the Malaysian govern ment have 
become increas ingly tenuous. In 1985, Far East Economic Review 
correspondent James Clad was charged under the Official Secrets Act over the 
publication of details from a leaked document about Ma laysia's relations with 
China. The following year, a three month ban on the dist rib ution of the The 
Asian Wall Street Journal was ordered along with the expulsion of the paper's 
two reporters. The row was over articles about cronyism in banking and 
economic mi smanagemen t in govern ment. 31 Such episodes suggest the 
government 's motivation has less to do with concerns of ethnic harmony and a 
democratic way of life as defined in Rukunegara than with maintenance of state 
power. 
Singapore: Prosperity and Paternalism 
In a similar fashion, Singapore's Peoples ' Action Party (PAP) governments have 
controlled news on the grounds of nation building and communal harmony . 
Nair, representing the government viewpoint, argues: 
The first and continued priori(y is creating one nation, one people out of the 
different religions and races ... The visceral, emotional pools are strong and 
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the social cohesion can easily be stirred if the press is allowed to abet and 
polarize the racial and religious differences by playing on emotions.n 
To entrench this priority a raft of laws and regulations, some dating back to the 
colonial period, remain in force. However, newer laws covering sedition and 
racial issues were "written to ensure social cohesion and that the freedom of the 
media are subordinate to the over-riding integrity of Singapore". 33 
Despite its status as a hub of regional communications and a convenient location 
for many regional news bureaux, Singapore has experienced deteriorating 
relations with the international press since the mid- 1980s. Haas attributes this to 
the uncertainty surrounding the departure of Lee Kuan Yew from the prime 
ministership. In these circumstances " the government acted as if it preferred to 
have a Third World policy".34 
A spate of circulation restrictions on foreign journals occurred in 1986 and 1987. 
This was made possible by two amendments to the Newspaper and Printing Press 
Act which empowered the government to "restrict the sales or distribution of 
foreign publications which have been declared as having engaged in the domestic 
politics of Singapore"35 In the course of the next two years drastic restrictions 
were placed on the circulation of Time, the Asian Wall Street Journal, Far 
Eastern Economic Review and Asiaweek in which the publications could only 
distribute several hundred copies in Singapore, often stripped of advertising. 
Afterwards, Lee Kuan Yew told the American Society of Newspaper Editors: 
"Singapore's domestic debate is a matter for Singaporeans. We allow American 
journalists in Singapore in order to report Singapore to their fellow countrymen 
... But we cannot allow them to assume a role in Singapore that the American 
media play in America, that of invigilator, adversary, and inquisitor of the 
administration."36 
To an extent, this situation reflects the weakness of the domestic media, both the 
compliant press and news service of the Singapore Broadcasting Corporation, 
which maintains an electronic media broadcast monopoly. 37 Of all the countries 
in this study, Singapore has achieved the greatest economic development. As 
will be argued in the following chapters, its maintenance of authoritarian 
information structures in a liberal economic environment is increasingly 
untenable. Haas argues that this policy is socially and politically contradictory, 
positing: "National unity cannot be perfected by preventing mature political 
expression."38 
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Thailand: A Contrast of Styles 
Thailand is something of an oddity in this study. Firstly, it has not been 
colonised in modern times and therefore has less arbitrarily defined borders or 
the related racial tensions. ' Nation-building' rarely appears in Thai media 
literature. Secondly, despite a string of military governments, the Thai press is 
relatively liberal. However, its television news does not have the same 
tradition. 39 Thailand's value in research stems from the fact that it has witnessed 
a national crisis since the arrival of international satellite television. A case can 
be made that those services contributed to the political patterns during and after 
the crisis. This will be canvassed in later chapters. 
Unlike the paramountcy of Pancasila in Indonesian Journalists' code of ethics, 
the code of the Thai Press Association states: "Promotion and maintenance of 
freedom of the press shall be the most important task of every member".'0 In a 
comprehensive review of Thai media history, Chirasopone asserts that Thai press 
controls have "fluctuated wildly between complete freedom and virtually 
complete repression" since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932. 41 The 
fortunes of the press have waxed and waned with the various civilian and 
military governments which have become something of a hallmark of 
contemporary Thai politics. Several press control acts remain in place, but have 
not been used extensively since the 1970s.'2 
Television began in Thailand much earlier than in other ASEAN countries. By 
1991 ninety three per cent of Thai households had access to television.'3 News 
on the five national networks, Channels 2, 3, 5, 7 and 9 and the Bangkok station 
Channel I I is closely controlled by the Communications Authority of Thailand. 
The print media enjoy far greater freedom compared to radio and television, 
which have been government monopolies . Unlike the print media, the electronic 
media have not changed much since they were first introduced more than 50 
years ago, especially in their relationship with the administration. Radio and 
television are almost completely controlled by government.+~ 
The terrestrial networks have been supplemented in the past few years by two 
Bangkok based narrowcasting networks - IBC and Thai Sky. In 1990 IBC began 
relaying CNN live to its viewers, although under the eye of the MCOT. 
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Indonesia: Pancasila and Palapa 
The pervasiveness of Pancasila in Indonesia's media system has already been 
alluded to in this chapter. The official role of media is quite unambiguous . 
{T}he press has been a very important element in the process of nation-
building, because ideas, policies and suggestions have to be disseminated 
through the press, including the electronic media ... {T}he press does not 
participate as an observer, a critic, or a controller of the Indonesian system 
as is the case in the Western system. No, it takes an active role, and has done 
so, in preserving and enhancing the national system, based upon the 
Pancasila philosophy. ~ 5 
These media requirements have not always existed in Indonesia. Upon 
independence from the Dutch, Indonesia adopted a multi-party parliamentary 
system. In this climate a vigorous and competitive press developed. Reflecting 
the contemporary Indonesian government perspective on this period, Sinaga 
records that the press "did not contribute much towards the needed stability in 
the country. Instead, it became an instrument of the various political parties and 
political groups" .46 While the Indonesian media of the 1950s was partisan, it was 
also ideologically diverse. This calls into question the idea that political 
consensus is somehow a tradition or cultural characteristic. In a study of 
Indonesian media, Tickell casts doubt on arguments that the 1950s experience 
was an 'un-lndonesian aberration'. "There have been times where the press in 
Indonesia has been direct and trenchant in its criticism of political leaders . "~7 
However, under Sukarno's guided democracy period and the New Order regime 
from 1966, media came under the influence of the military as part of its dual 
function (dwi fungsi) of military and socio-political roles. "[S]ubstantial, direct 
army involvement in political affairs were to fundamentally change the ' rules' 
under which the Indonesian press worked."~8 
The rules of the Pancasila press are complex and detailed, but only a brief outline 
is required here to press the point that they are tools of significant state control 
and broadly reflect the New Order government's attitude to news. Amendments 
in 1982 to the 1966 Press Act require each press enterprise to obtain a publication 
permit. These licences can be revoked without trial if, for instance, a publication 
is judged to have endangered political stability that is required for economic 
development.~9 Publications are obliged to "strengthen national unity" and 
integrity and to "exercise social control which is constructive".50 The threat of 
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revocation of licences if these obligations are not met would appear to be a factor 
pressuring journalists towards self-censorship - "one of the worst types of 
restraint because of its subtle, insidious and habit-forming possibilities".5 ' The 
threats are numerous, public, and quite specific. For instance, The Jakarta Post 
of 5 June 1989 reports of three formal government reprimands to newspapers for 
"misquoting cabinet ministers" and "printing off the record statements". The 
item was based on a press release from the Ministry of Information and recorded 
that all editors had apologised "for their errors". The article reported that the 
ministry "admonished Media Indonesia to be more careful in the future " ... so 
that the government will not be forced to revoke the daily's licence"."52 A more 
dramatic example arose earlier this year with the closure of the Indonesian 
magazines Tempo, Editor and Ditik because of their coverage of tensions within 
the Indonesian government, television has evolved with a similar journalistic 
ethos. However Indonesia's television industry has a rather special place in Asia 
through the country's ownership of the Palapa satellite. The system remains a 
key conduit of information exchange and delivery in the region. 
The early days of Indonesian television were low-key and rather inauspicious. 
The national television network Television Republik Indonesia (TVRI) 
commenced broadcasts on 24 August 1962 in preparation for the Asian Games 
in Jakarta. The next year President Sukarno outlined the basic policy guidelines 
for programmes, including news. The key point was "the statement of the task 
and function of television as a tool serving and supporting the development of 
the Indonesian nation". 53 With Sukarno's downfall in 1966, the New Order 
Government of Suharto assigned three policy goals to TVRI: " the promotion of 
national unity and integration; the promotion of national development; the 
promotion of political stability". 5' Under these guidelines there has been "heavy 
emphasis on development events, the restraint from controversial and ethnically 
sensitive issues, the concentration on news in and around the capital - these 
characteristics can best be understood in the context of the political system, the 
policy goals, and the plural society".55 Recent government statements reinforce 
the state orientation of Television Republik Indonesia (TVRI), labelling its 
function as promoting national unity and integrity, national development and 
political stability.56 
Indonesia's first commercial television network- RCTI- was opened in 1989. 
Delivered by Palapa satellite, viewers require a decoder to view the service. As 
mentioned, this channel is closely aligned to the ruling elite of Indonesia. The 
channel telecasts more popular Western programming than TVRI. At its 
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inauguration ceremony, the Information Minister, Harmoko, said "RCTI must 
make sure that its broadcasts don't have negative impact on the national cu lture 
and local values".57 Since then two more commercial networks have emerged in 
Indonesia: SCTV and the former education channel Televisi Pendidikan 
Indonesia (TPI). 58 
This brings us to the development of the Palapa satellite system. Indonesia was 
the first developing nation to launch its own domestic satellite and the third of all 
nations, after the US and Canada. The first Palapa satellite was launched in 
1976, its role to improve domestic telecommunications and television 
penetration across the archipelago. Before that time television could only be 
received around Jakarta and a few large provincial centres. Not surprisingly, 
themes of nation-building and development were a feature of government 
statements surrounding Palapa. 
Perhaps reflecting the Javanese ethnocentrism often attributed to Jakarta 's ruling 
state elite, Indonesia's former foreign minister, Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja said 
in 1988: 
The satellite communications system ... plays an important role in the 
country's national development. In a country such as Indonesia, whose 
peoples cover a broad spectrum from the stone-age civilization in Irian Jaya 
to the computer-age community in the capital ... the building of an entity 
which can call itself a modern nation is indeed a great challenge. In 
Indonesia, the nation building role is played mainly by, or through, 
television. 59 
Evidence from the US-based East-West Centre and the Indonesia Science 
Institute suggested the Indonesian government's Palapa strategy was working. 
[T]elevision broadcasts using the Palapa have increased the public's national 
awareness considerably and improved the rural com!IIUnity's ability to speak 
the national language. It has also proven to be an effective agent of 
innovation in the sectors of agriculture, education,fami!y planning and public 
health.ro 
Evidence from the US based East-West Centre and the Indonesia Science 
Institute suggested that the Indonesian government 's Palapa strategy was 
working. 
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Television's penetration in Indonesia is impressive, especially in contrast to 
the print media, largely due to Palapa. Indonesian television reaches more 
than 100 million viewers each day- more than tiVo thirds of the populatio11. ~ 1 
However, at the same time as domestic uses arose for Palapa, there also 
developed an international perspective. As outlined in the introduction, the 
primary Palapa footprint covers not only Indonesia, but an area from Bangladesh, 
across southern China to Taiwan and down to Papua New Guinea and northern 
Australia. For one thing, this introduced the phenomenon of 'spill-overs' to the 
region, where owners of parabolic antennae could tune into broadcasts from 
neighbouring countries. 
This international perspective is absolutely critical to this paper when it is seen 
in the context of the global economy. At the time the New Order government 
was pressing for nation-building and development, it was also seeking to expand 
into the international marketplace. A key catalyst was the slump in oil prices of 
the 1980s. The government had become dependent on oil revenues for the 
expansion of national infrastructure in the 1970s. Indonesia's television system 
was among this infrastructural development. "TVRI's activities only began to 
pick up in the 1970s when the oil boom brought in profits for the nation."62 In 
turn, the collapse of oil prices prompted the government to seek non-oil export 
earnings. 
One response was to seek more foreign economic activity in Indonesia. In 1987 
Hainsworth noted: "Efforts are being intensified to rekindle the interest and 
stimulate the participation of foreign firms in Indonesia's economic revival.""" In 
a sense, there was a need to use whatever fruits of Indonesian modernisation 
existed in the international marketplace. One area was telecommunications. In 
this climate, the Indonesian government rented satellite transponder space to 
neighbouring countries for the delivery of their domestic services. Malaysia, The 
Philippines and Thailand had become the initial users of Palapa in 1978 using 
five transponders, but during the 1980s the number rented to ASEAN 
governments or organisations climbed to fifteen. By 1990, each of these 
transponder rentals earned Indonesia US$1 million annually .(>l While this policy 
did bring in valuable export revenue, it meant viewers in each country could 
watch the material from any other provided they owned a parabolic antenna. 
During this time a rapid growth occurred in the ownership of the parabolic 
antennae. Recent figures suggest the number of households and hotel rooms 
receiving services via Palapa are 564,000 in Indonesia, 140,000 in Thailand and 
68,000 in Malaysia.''5 
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In effect, the policy of delivering other countries ' domestic services via the 
Palapa satellite exposed a chink in the armour of media sovereignty. By 
becoming involved in the international communications marketplace, the 
Indonesian government gave television viewers in four ASEAN countries the 
opportunity to watch each other's programming. It will be argued in Chapters 3 
and 4 that this internationalisation of programming contributed to the 
deregulation of domestic television several years later in some countries and laid 
the groundwork for the arrival of European and United States broadcasters. In 
line with the long-standing media control ethos, an attempt was made by the 
Indonesian government in 1986 to restrict the use of parabolic antennae for the 
viewing of foreign services. This was, however, judged three years later by the 
director of TVRI to be 'difficult to enforce' .66 Elements of the government were 
perhaps sensing that the genie was out of the bottle, but had not yet officially 
acknowledged Indonesians could watch services from other countries. 
Summary 
News and information via the mass media have been a cornerstone of Southeast 
Asian governments' efforts to entrench state power. Indonesia, Singapore and 
Malaysia embody the ethnically diverse, post-colonial states, whose leaderships 
embarked on programmes of nation-building to cement their authority. In the 
immediate post-independence era in Southeast Asia, pluralist press systems 
emerged that reflected the class and ethnic divisions in the societies. These 
systems have been gradually brought under state control in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Singapore through a combination of educative and punitive measures. There 
remains persistent tension though as Western-liberal practices endure, among 
both indigenous and foreign journalists. There is little evidence of such tension 
in state television, perhaps because it developed only after the authoritarian state 
systems were well-entrenched. Television policies are a product of those 
systems. Industry hardware and programme control belongs to the state. 
The first signs of erosion of the state monopoly of television news occurred as 
Indonesia entered the international telecommunications marketplace. While the 
ASEAN customers of Palapa were careful to respect each other's sovereignty, 
economic pressures and international elite collaboration were to pave the way for 
partnerships with Western companies. 
The fact that the hardware (parabolic antennae) for reception was in place across 
such a large area made the facility highly attractive to international media 
organisations, which were looking to expand from the developed world. The 
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Indonesian state was becoming a player in an industry from which it derived 
economic benefits. The offset was that this diluted its hitherto well-entrenched 
control over media. In a broad economic sense the government was cornered. 
"The rapidly increasing national debt and reliance on foreign sources of loan and 
investment capital meant that international business was now in a more 
favourable position to dictate terms."67 
Each of the states in this paper has followed a developmental media policy in 
one form or another. From the evidence in the chapter, there is a strong case to 
suggest a lack of dynamism in the concept of development journalism. The 
increased economic development and industrialisation it encourages mean that, 
in time, it will be internally challenged as material living standards improve. 
This gives rise to tension between increasingly affluent sections of the polity -
which may demand media liberalisation - and the restrictive environment that, in 
part, has contributed to that affluence. In a sense, the policy contains a sunset 
clause. 
The policies of economic liberalisation and telecommunications development -
while designed to encourage national growth through economic strength - were 
to spawn sizeable unintended consequences. The scope and pace of change in 
the region's electronic media sector over a period of just a few years was to be 
massive and far reaching. 
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